In a significant ruling on April 23, 2025, the Aurangabad Bench of the Bombay High Court held that Talaq-e-Ahsan—a traditional, staggered form of divorce recognized in Muslim personal law—is not punishable under Section 4 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019.

The Court quashed the FIR and subsequent criminal proceedings against a Muslim man and his parents, terming them an "abuse of process of law."

A Division Bench comprising Justice Vibha Kankanwadi and Justice Sanjay A. Deshmukh delivered the ruling while hearing the case Tanveer Ahmed and Ors v. State of Maharashtra. The applicants had sought quashing of FIR No. 124/2024 lodged at Bhusawal Bazar Peth Police Station, Jalgaon, and the related criminal proceedings (RCC No. 1156/2024).

The complainant—wife of the first applicant—alleged that the husband had pronounced an irrevocable talaq, falling under the purview of Section 4 of the 2019 Act and attracting Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. However, the Court clarified that the talaq in question was not Talaq-e-Biddat (instant and irrevocable), which is criminalised under the Act, but Talaq-e-Ahsan, involving a single pronouncement followed by a 90-day iddat period with no cohabitation.

Referring to Section 2(c) of the Act, which defines talaq as “talaq-e-biddat or any similar form having the effect of instantaneous and irrevocable divorce,” the Bench highlighted that the FIR itself acknowledged the divorce was Talaq-e-Ahsan. The Court observed:

“What has been described in the definition of talaq is instantaneous and irrevocable. Here, in the FIR itself, respondent No.2 has stated... what was given to her was Talaq-e-Ahsan.”

The Court further cited the Supreme Court’s 1981 ruling in Mst. Zohara Khatoon v. Mohd. Ibrahim, and High Court decisions in Shaikh Taslim Shaikh Hakim v. State of Maharashtra (2022) and Jahfer Sadiq E.A. v. Marwa (Kerala, 2022), which all reaffirm the validity of Talaq-e-Ahsan and Talaq-e-Hasan under Muslim personal law.

On the inclusion of the husband’s parents in the FIR, the Bench made it clear:

“There is no question of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code involved… There cannot be a common intention of pronouncement of Talaq.”

Emphasising that criminal proceedings in such a context were unwarranted, the Court concluded:

“What was prohibited was the Talaq-e-Biddat and not Talaq-e-Ahsan… it would be an abuse of process of law if the applicants are asked to face the trial.”

Accordingly, the application was allowed and both the FIR and pending criminal case were quashed in their entirety.