The Orissa High Court has held that a wife’s failure to report her husband missing or actively search for him, combined with living with another man, does not constitute criminal conspiracy under Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

A division bench, comprising Justice S.K. Sahoo and Justice Chittaranjan Dash, overturned the conviction of a woman accused of conspiring to murder her husband and later entering a relationship with another man. The court underscored the importance of clear evidence over mere suspicion in such cases.

The case revolved around the disappearance of Nibedita Panda's husband, who went missing on December 12, 2007, after leaving home on a motorcycle with a co-accused. Despite his prolonged absence, Nibedita neither reported him missing nor made any effort to locate him and was alleged to have started living with another man during this time. The trial court convicted her under Section 120-B of the IPC, sentencing her to life imprisonment.

The High Court examined three key issues in its analysis:

1. Whether the wife’s inaction regarding her husband’s disappearance could be construed as evidence of conspiracy involving her and her alleged paramour.
2. Whether her relationship with a co-accused suggested an intent to commit a crime.
3. What standard of proof is necessary to establish guilt under Section 120-B IPC.

In response to the first question, the court concluded that the evidence against the woman did not meet the stringent standard required for a conviction under Section 120-B IPC. Although her behavior appeared suspicious, it fell short of conclusively proving her active involvement in the alleged conspiracy.

The court, while considering the circumstantial evidence against the wife and her paramour, observed, “Law is well settled that suspicion, however strong, cannot be a substitute for proof of guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. In dealing with circumstantial evidence, there is always a danger that conjecture or suspicion lingering on mind might take the place of proof, and therefore, the Court has to be watchful and ensure that such things should not take place.”

The court highlighted a critical inconsistency in the prosecution's case: while the wife was charged under Section 120-B IPC for allegedly conspiring with her paramour, no such charge was framed against the paramour. This discrepancy undermined the prosecution’s argument. Referring to the precedent set in Girija Sankar Misra v. State of U.P. (1993), the court emphasized that "an accused alone cannot be convicted for the offence of conspiracy, as conspiracy requires the involvement of more than one individual. If the other alleged conspirators are acquitted, a single remaining accused cannot be convicted under that section."

The court also referenced the judgment in Ram Sharan Chaturvedi v. State of M.P. (2022), reiterating that a “physical manifestation” of an agreement is indispensable to establish criminal conspiracy. Merely sharing thoughts or acting suspiciously does not meet this threshold. “In the present case, the prosecution has utterly failed to conclusively prove transmission of thoughts between the appellant Nibedita Panda and other accused persons, leave alone putting forward any acceptable and rigid evidence regarding physical manifestation of agreement. Therefore, when the basic ingredient of the offence of criminal conspiracy i.e. agreement between at least two persons, is not proved, no strength remains in the prosecution argument that the appellant Nibedita Panda is liable for criminal conspiracy,” the court stated.

Furthermore, the court found that the evidence, including statements from the children of the deceased, did not support the elements necessary to establish a criminal conspiracy. Even assuming that the wife’s paramour visited the house and later stayed with her after the victim's disappearance, or that the wife failed to report her husband missing, such actions, while suspicious, were not enough to prove a conspiracy. 

As a result, the court acquitted the appellant under Section 120-B IPC, concluding that “in the absence of any other clinching evidence, relying solely on these suspicious behaviors of the appellant is insufficient to convict her for the offence of criminal conspiracy.”