Supreme Court sets aside Court Martial proceedings against an Army Officer

Supreme Court sets aside Court Martial proceedings against an Army Officer

The division bench of the Supreme Court on Monday set aside the General Court Martial (GCM) proceedings against a colonel facing allegations of having an affair with another officer's wife that had become time-barred. The court martial proceedings against an army officer was dismissed because they were barred by the limitations prescribed in Section 122 of the Army Act.

Section 122 of Army Act Reads as under:-

"122. Period of limitation for trial."

(1) Except as provided by sub-section (2), no trial by court-martial of any person subject to this Act for any offence shall be commenced after the expiration of a period of three years, and such period shall commence.

(a) on the date of the offence; or

(b) where the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to the authority consenting to initiate action, the first day on which such offence comes to the knowledge of such person or authority, whichever is earlier; or

(c) where it is not known by whom the offence was committed, the first day on which the identity of the offender is known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to the authority competent to initiate action, whichever is earlier.

(2) The provisions of sub- section (1) shall not apply to a trial for an offence of desertion or fraudulent enrolment or for any of the offences mentioned in section 37.

(3) In the computation of the period of time mentioned in sub- section (1), any time spent by such person as a prisoner of war, or in enemy territory, or in evading arrest after the commission of the offence, shall be excluded.

(4) No trial for an offence of desertion other than desertion on active service or of fraudulent enrolment shall be commenced if the person in question, not being an officer, has subsequently to the commission of the offence, served continuously in an exemplary manner for not less than three years with any portion of the regular Army."

On August 13, 2015, a colonel filed a complaint with his brigade commander alleging an improper relationship between his wife and the accused officer, prompting the formation of a court of inquiry. The Army issued orders on November 22, 2018, directing that the accused officer be tried by GCM.

While the accused officer claimed that the day the complaint was sent was the date the alleged offence was brought to the attention of the aggrieved party, the Army claimed that it was not until the summary of evidence was completed at a later stage that a prima facie case was made out against the accused. He filed an original application with the Armed Forces Tribunal under Section 14 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007, challenging the charge-sheet and the appellant's general court-martial trial direction. In the aforementioned application, he raised a question about the period of limitation under Section 122 of the Army Act. After the Tribunal denied his OA, he petitioned the Supreme Court.

Taking into account the dates involved in this case, the court determined that August 13, 2015, was the critical date on which the aggrieved person was aware of the alleged offense.

"In the instant case, having regard to the contents of the letter dated 13.08.2015 written by the aggrieved person i.e., Col. Ramneesh Singh to the concerned authority, it clearly transpires that he was aware of the alleged act of the appellant having stolen the affection of his wife on the date of the said letter. He had specifically mentioned in the said letter that it was for bringing to the notice of the concerned authority about the appellant’s act of stealing affection of his wife. He had further alleged therein that the appellant was sending indecent messages to his wife which were sexually explicit in nature and that he had reasonable cause to believe that the appellant and his wife had indulged in illegitimate physical relationship with each other. Therefore, the date 13.08.2015 would be the crucial date on which the aggrieved person had the knowledge about the commission of the alleged offence. Therefore the time had started running from the said date for the purpose of Section 122 of the said Act. In that view of the matter, the submission of the learned senior advocate appearing for the respondents that date of aggrieved person’s knowledge about the commission of the alleged offence by the appellant, should be construed as the date when the respondents prima facie concluded after the Court of Inquiry that the appellant had committed the offence, cannot be accepted. The date 13.08.2015 therefore would be the date on which the aggrieved persons i.e., Col. Ramneesh Pal Singh had the knowledge about the commission of the alleged offence by the appellant. The Convening Authority having directed the trial by General Court Martial vide order dated 22.11.2018, the same was clearly beyond three years and therefore barred under Section 122 of the Act."

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