The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the 'Uttar Pradesh Board of Madarsa Education Act, 2004,' on November 5, overturning the previous judgment of the Allahabad High Court that had declared it invalid.

The Supreme Court ruled that the High Court made an error in invalidating the Act based on the claim that it violated the basic structure principle of secularism. The Court clarified that a statute can only be struck down if it infringes upon fundamental rights as outlined in Part III of the Constitution or contravenes provisions concerning legislative competence.

"The Constitutional validity of a statute cannot be challenged for violation of the basic structure of the Constitution. In a challenge to the statute for the violation of the principles of secularism, it must be shown that the statute violates provisions of the Constitution pertaining to secularism. The High Court erred in holding that the statute is bound to be struck down if it is violative of the basic structure," the Supreme Court held.

However, the Court determined that the Madarsa Act is unconstitutional insofar as it regulates higher education related to 'fazil' and 'kamil' degrees, as it conflicts with the provisions of the UGC Act.

A bench consisting of Chief Justice of India DY Chandrachud, Justice JB Pardiwala, and Justice Manoj Misra reviewed the challenge to the Allahabad High Court's March 22 judgment, which had declared the 'Uttar Pradesh Board of Madarsa Education Act, 2004' unconstitutional.

The Court concluded that the provisions of the Madarsa Act are reasonable, as they aim to enhance academic excellence among students and enable them to prepare for examinations. Additionally, the Act protects the interests of the minority community in Uttar Pradesh by (1) establishing educational standards in Madrasas and (2) conducting examinations that confer certificates, thus allowing students to pursue higher education.

The High Court made an error in asserting that the education provided under the Madarsa Act violated Article 21A for several reasons: (1) the Right to Education Act does not extend to minority educational institutions; (2) Article 30 safeguards the right of religious minorities to establish and manage Madrasas for both religious and secular education; and (3) the Board and the State Government possess adequate regulatory authority to set standards for Madrasas.

Although Madrasas provide religious instruction, their primary focus is on education. Consequently, the Court identified the legislative competence of the Act under Entry 25 of List III (the Concurrent List), which pertains to education. The presence of religious teachings or instructions within the regulated education does not, by itself, remove the legislation from the legislative competence of the State.

The Court stated that the corollary to Article 28(3) is that religious instruction may be provided in educational institutions recognized by the State or receiving State aid; however, no student can be compelled to participate in such religious instruction within these institutions.

The petitions in the Supreme Court were submitted by Anjum Kadari, the Managers Association Madaris Arabiya (UP), the All India Teachers Association Madaris Arabiya (New Delhi), the Manager Association Arbi Madarsa Nai Bazar, and the Teachers Association Madaris Arabiya Kanpur.

During the two-day hearing, the petitioners primarily argued that the High Court had misinterpreted the UP Madarsa Act as primarily focused on imparting religious instruction, rather than recognizing its actual purpose, which is to establish a regulatory framework for the education of Muslim children.

In contrast, the intervenors opposing the Act, along with the National Commission for Protection of Children's Rights (NCPCR), emphasized that Madarsa education undermines the quality of education promised under Article 21A of the Constitution. They argued that while individuals have the freedom to receive religious instruction, it cannot serve as a substitute for mainstream education.

In April, the Supreme Court had issued a stay on the High Court's judgment, observing prima facie that the High Court had misconstrued the Act.

While declaring the law as ultra vires, the Division Bench, consisting of Justice Vivek Chaudhary and Justice Subhash Vidyarthi, also directed the Uttar Pradesh Government to formulate a scheme to ensure that students currently enrolled in Madrasas can be integrated into the formal education system.

The High Court's rulings stemmed from a writ petition filed by Anshuman Singh Rathore, who challenged the vires of the UP Madarsa Board and objected to the management of Madrasas by the Minority Welfare Department, along with other related issues involving both the Union of India and the State Government.

Appearances for the petitioners: Dr. A. M Singhvi, Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, Mr. P.S. Patwalia, Mr. P Chidambaram, Dr. Menaka Guruswamy, Mr. Salman Khurshid, Mr. MR Shamshad Senior Advocates assisted by Rohit Amit Sthalekar AOR Sankalp Narain Adv, M.A Ausaf, Adv, HP Sahi Adv, Yash Johari Adv & Utkarsh Pratap Adv appeared for the Petitioners in the aforesaid matters.

Additional Solicitor General KM Nataraj appeared for the State of UP. Senior Advocate Swarupama Chaturvedi appeared for the NCPCR and Senior Advocate Madhavi Divan appeared for an intervenor opposing the Act.