The Delhi High Court has reaffirmed that instructional videos and training courses are considered literary works under Section 2(o) of the Copyright Act, 1957, and also qualify as cinematographic films under Section 2(f) of the same Act.

While issuing a temporary restraining order, the Court observed that the Defendants had violated the exclusive rights outlined in Section 14 of the Copyright Act and had illicitly distributed the course videos and materials without authorization.

Justice Prathiba M Singh while deciding the case, observed that “in the present case, the Plaintiff holds ownership over the course material, falling within the category of “literary works” as defined by Section 2(o) of the Copyright Act, 1957. The videos of the Plaintiff on various subjects also qualify as "cinematographic films" under Section 2(f) of the Copyright Act, 1957. Consequently, both "literary works" and "cinematographic films" receive protection under Sections 2(o) and 2(f) of the Copyright Act, 1957. Moreover, Section 14 of the Copyright Act acknowledges exclusive rights that belong to the copyright holder. Given that the Plaintiffs' works are safeguarded by the Copyright Act, 1957, any unauthorized distribution or communication, whether in print or electronic form, would amount to copyright infringement.”

The Plaintiff in this case operated an online training business, offering candidates access to recorded videos and live sessions for various skills. Upon payment of the required fee, the Plaintiff granted candidates access to their materials through a website, www.apnacollege.com. The Plaintiff argued that their content was not designed for download and could only be accessed if a candidate intentionally attempted to download it. The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant used social media to disseminate their materials to students, charging fees ranging from Rs. 50 to Rs. 1,000. Consequently, the Plaintiff claimed that the Defendant had violated their copyright and had created multiple channels across social media platforms to share such material. The Plaintiff approached the Court through an Application, seeking an interim injunction against the Defendant.

The Court took note of the fact that the Defendants employed various methods to distribute the Plaintiff's courses, videos, and other materials on digital platforms. Regrettably, the Court underscored that these platforms facilitate the effortless copying and reproduction of copyrighted materials. Additionally, the Court observed that several groups and channels on these platforms had amassed hundreds of subscribers. The Defendants were found to be generating a significant income by distributing the Plaintiff's copyrighted material for free. Furthermore, some evidence indicated that the Defendants were enticing students and candidates to subscribe to their channels instead of paying the Plaintiff's fees, as asserted by the Court.

Nevertheless, the Court ruled that the Plaintiff possessed legal ownership of the course materials, falling within the definition of "literary works" as outlined in Section 2(o) of the Copyright Act. Additionally, the Court recognized that the Plaintiff's videos covering various subjects met the criteria for "cinematographic films" as defined in Section 2(f) of the same Act. Consequently, both "literary works" and "cinematographic films" enjoyed protection under Sections 2(o) and 2(f) of the Copyright Act, 1957 (Act). Section 14 of the Act delineates the exclusive rights granted to copyright holders. Any unauthorized distribution or communication of these works, whether in printed or electronic form, would constitute copyright infringement, given the protection afforded to the Plaintiff's works.

The Court determined that the Plaintiff had a compelling case, and the balance of convenience weighed in favor of the Plaintiff. The Court emphasized that permitting the Defendants to persist in infringing on the Plaintiff's copyrighted material would result in irreparable harm. This harm would manifest in substantial financial losses for the Plaintiff, as well as a loss of subscribers and damage to their reputation and goodwill.

The Court is firmly convinced that the Plaintiff has successfully presented a prima facie case. As a result, the balance of convenience clearly aligns with the Plaintiff, and allowing the infringing activity to persist would result in irreparable harm. If the Defendants are not restrained from sharing the Plaintiff's copyrighted material, the Plaintiff would incur substantial financial losses, lose subscribers, and suffer damage to their reputation and goodwill. Therefore, the Court has recognized the necessity of granting an injunction to prevent any further dissemination of the Plaintiff's copyrighted material.

The Court has ruled that Telegram is required to receive the specific channel or handle details mentioned in the complaint within a three-day timeframe. Subsequently, Telegram will be given 72 hours to block these channels. Furthermore, the Court has mandated that Telegram must disclose any available information about the individuals or entities responsible for operating these channels, including their email addresses and phone numbers. Once this information is provided, the defendants will be included in the ongoing lawsuit.

As a result, the Court granted the injunction and scheduled the case for further proceedings on March 22, 2024.

Case: Jainemo Private Limited v Rahul Shah and Ors, CS(COMM) 676/2023 & I.As. 18922/2023, 18923/2023, 18924/2023, 18925/2023, 18926/2023, 18927/2023, 18928/2023