The Supreme Court, in the case of Dahiben vs. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra)(D) Thr Lrs, decided on July 9, 2020, explicitly affirmed that the non-payment of a portion of the sale consideration does not render a registered Sale Deed void, nor does it provide a valid basis for its cancellation. In real estate transactions, it is customary for cheques to be presented as part of the sales consideration during the execution of the sale deed, and these are duly specified in the document.

Despite a common belief among sellers that a sale deed becomes automatically 'void' and ineffective if the accompanying cheques are dishonored, the legal stance, as clarified by various High Courts and the Apex Court, contradicts this perception. In such instances, sellers are required to resort to civil courts by initiating a lawsuit for the recovery of the outstanding consideration. The courts unequivocally state that the sale deed cannot be declared invalid, nor can a suit for its cancellation be filed on this ground.

The case in question involved agricultural land in District Surat, transferred by the plaintiffs through a registered sale deed dated July 2, 2009, to Respondent No. 1 for a consideration of Rs. 1,74,02,000. The respondent issued 36 cheques for the payment, which were detailed in the sale deed. Subsequently, the respondent sold the land to Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 via a registered sale deed dated April 1, 2013, for a consideration of Rs. 2,01,00,000.

The plaintiffs filed a Special Civil Suit against the original purchaser (Respondent No. 1) and the subsequent purchasers (Respondent Nos. 2 and 3), seeking the cancellation of the sale deed dated July 2, 2009. They argued that the sale consideration had not been fully paid by Respondent No. 1. The plaintiffs contended that they were illiterate and unaware of the sale deed's contents when they affixed their thumb impressions. According to them, Respondent No. 1 paid only Rs. 40,000 through six cheques, and the remaining 30 cheques for Rs. 1,73,62,000 were fake and unpaid.

The plaintiffs requested the restoration of physical possession of the lands. The respondents argued that the suit was barred by limitation. The Gujarat High Court upheld the trial court's decision, affirming that the plaintiff's suit was time-barred.

The Supreme Court bench summarized the applicable law for deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, referring to the judgment in Vidyadhar v. Manikrao (1999) 3 SCC 573 and Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The court clarified that the requirement for the actual payment of the entire price at the time of executing the sale deed is not a mandatory condition for completing the sale.

The Court held thus:

The plaintiffs have presented a case in their complaint, alleging the non-payment of a portion of the sale consideration, and have sought the remedy of canceling the Sale Deed on this ground. Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, articulates the following:

Section 54. Sale defined-Sale is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised.

This definition of sale signifies that there must be a complete transfer of ownership from one person to another, encompassing the transfer of all rights and interests in the property held by the transferor to the transferee. The transferor cannot retain any fraction of interest or right in the property, as this would negate the essence of a sale. Additionally, the definition emphasizes that the transfer of ownership must occur in consideration of a price paid, promised, or part-paid and part-promised. Consequently, the price constitutes a fundamental element of the sale transaction.

In the case of Vidyadhar v. Manikrao & Anr (1999) 3 SCC 573, this Court established that the expression "price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised" indicates that the actual payment of the entire price at the time of executing the Sale Deed is not an indispensable condition for the completion of the sale. Even if the full price is not paid, but the document is executed and subsequently registered, the sale is deemed complete, and the title passes to the transferee under the transaction.

The absence of payment for a part of the sale price does not compromise the validity of the sale. Once the title to the property has been transferred, even if the remaining sale consideration is not paid, the sale cannot be invalidated on this basis. For a sale to be recognized, the parties must have the intention to transfer ownership of the property, agreeing to pay the price either immediately or in the future.

The parties' intent is discerned from the content of the sale deed, the conduct of the parties, and the evidence on record. According to the precedent set by this Court, even if the Plaintiffs' allegations are accepted as true, stating that the entire sale consideration had not been paid, it does not constitute grounds for canceling the Sale Deed. The Plaintiffs may have alternative legal remedies for recovering the outstanding consideration, but they cannot be granted the relief of canceling the registered Sale Deed.

It is relevant to quote the pertinent excerpt from the judgment in Vidyadhar v. Manikrao & Anr (Supra), which states:
[Include the relevant extract from the judgment]

"35. Even if the findings recorded by the High Court that the plaintiff had paid only Rs. 500 to defendant No. 2 as sale consideration and the remaining amount of Rs. 4,500 which was shown to have been paid before the execution of the deed was, in fact, not paid, the sale deed would not, for that reason, become invalid on account of the provisions contained in Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act which provide as under:

54. Sale is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part- paid and part-promised.
Such a transfer, in the case of tangible immoveable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, or in the case of a reversion or other intangible thing, can be made only by a registered instrument.

In the case of tangible immoveable property, of a value less than one hundred rupees, such transfer may be made either by a registered instrument or by delivery of the property.

Delivery of tangible immoveable property takes place when the seller places the buyer, or such person as he directs; in possession of the property.

A contract for the sale of immoveable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties.
It does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property.

36. The definition indicates that in order to constitute a sale, there must be a transfer of ownership from one person to another, i.e., transfer of all rights and interests in the properties which are possessed by that person are transferred by him to another person. The transferor cannot retain any part of his interest or right in that property or else it would not be a sale. The definition further says that the transfer of ownership has to be for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised. Price thus constitutes an essential ingredient of the transaction of sale. The words price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised indicate that actual payment of whole of the price at the time of the execution of sale deed is not sine qua non to the completion of the sale. Even if the whole of the price is not paid but the document is executed and thereafter registered, if the property is of the value of more than Rs. 100/-, the sale would be complete.

37. There is a catena of decisions of various High Courts in which it has been held that even if the whole of the price is not paid, the transaction of sale will take effect and the title would pass under that transaction. To cite only a few, in Gyatri Prasad v. Board of Revenue and Ors. (1973) Allahabad Law Journal 412, it was held that non-payment of a portion of the sale price would not effect validity of sale. It was observed that part payment of consideration by vendee itself proved the intention to pay the remaining amount of sale price. To the same effect is the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Sukaloo and Anr. v. Punau AIR 1961 MP 176.

38. The real test is the intention of the parties. In order to constitute a sale, the parties must intend to transfer the ownership of the property and they must also intend that the price would be paid either in presenti or in future. The intention is to be gathered from the recital in the sale deed, conduct of the parties and the evidence on record."

It would be trite to refer to the case of Bishundeo Narain Rai vs. Anmol Devi & Ors. 1998 (7) SCC 498 where the Apex Court had occasion to consider the question as to when the ownership and title in a property will pass to the transferee, under a deed of conveyance.

The Supreme Court observed that Section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act explicitly states that upon the transfer of property, all the interests held by the transferor at that time, capable of passing in the property and in its legal incidence, are transferred unless a different intention is expressed or necessarily implied.

Upon a comprehensive examination of Section 8 and Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, it can be inferred that, although the execution and registration of a sale deed result in the transfer of ownership and all interests in the property to the transferee, this transfer is contingent upon the terms and conditions outlined in the deed, reflecting the parties' intentions.

Consequently, the ownership title and all interests in the property are transferred to the purchaser upon the execution and registration of a sale deed, unless there is a different intention either expressly stated or necessarily implied. The burden of proving that title has not passed upon the registration of the sale deed lies with the party making such a claim. This intention can be ascertained through intrinsic evidence, such as the content of the sale deed itself or other surrounding circumstances, subject to the provisions of Section 92 of the Evidence Act, 1872.

It is relevant to cite the case of Kaliaperumal vs. Rajagopal & Anr. 2009 (4) SCC 193, where the Supreme Court addressed the present issue and established the following principles:

1.    The payment of the entire price is not a prerequisite for completing the sale and passing of title, as Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, defines sale as a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised.
2.    If the intention of the parties was for the title to pass upon execution and registration, it would do so even if the full sale price or part thereof is not paid. In case of non-payment, the vendor's remedy is limited to suing for the balance price, and avoiding the sale is not an option. However, the vendor is entitled to a charge upon the property for the unpaid part of the sale price under Section 55(4)(b) of the Act.
3.    Although ownership and title typically pass to the purchaser on the registration of the sale deed, this is not an absolute rule. The true test of the passing of property is the intention of the parties. While registration is prima facie evidence of an intention to transfer the property, it is not conclusive if payment of consideration is a condition precedent for the property's transfer.
4.    The determination of whether the parties intended the transfer of ownership to occur solely through the execution and registration of the deed or only after the receipt of the entire consideration depends on their intention, primarily gathered from the sale deed's recitals. If the recitals are insufficient or ambiguous, surrounding circumstances and parties' conduct can be considered, subject to the limitations in Section 92 of the Evidence Act, 1872.
5.    In cases where possession and title deeds are not delivered to the purchaser either on the date of sale or thereafter, it may indicate that the title was intended to pass only after the payment of the full price. The recital in the sale deed about the purchaser being entitled to hold, possess, and enjoy the properties from the date of sale may not be conclusive, especially when possession is not actually delivered.
6.    When a sale deed states that on receiving the total consideration, the property is conveyed, and possession is delivered, the clear intention is that title and possession would pass only upon the payment of the entire sale consideration. Therefore, if the sale deed recites that the vendor is conveying the property on receipt of the entire consideration, but the purchaser admits non-payment or the vendor proves non-receipt of the entire sale consideration, the title in the property would not pass to the purchaser.

It is necessary to cite the case of Baijnath Singh vs. Paltu and others, (1908) ILR 30, Allahabad Page 125, where the Allahabad High Court made a significant observation. In this case, it was noted that if a sale deed states that the sale consideration was paid, but the court determines that no actual consideration was exchanged, the non-payment of the purchase money does not hinder the transfer of ownership of the purchased property from the vendor to the purchaser. Even in the absence of the payment, the purchaser has the right to bring a lawsuit for the possession of the property.

In another notable case, Chandrashankar Manishankar vs. Abhla Mathur and others, reported in AIR (39) 1952 Bombay 56, it was established that the recital in a document indicating payment of consideration may not necessarily be true, but this discrepancy does not render the document invalid. The court clarified that for a sale to be valid, it is not essential that the entire price be paid, as Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act specifies that the price may be paid or promised wholly or in part.

Furthermore, the court emphasized that if the consideration was not actually paid, but the document reflects an intention to make the payment, then the document is not invalidated due to non-payment of consideration. However, if the intention was never to pay any consideration, then the document is deemed void and of no effect. This ruling underscores the importance of the parties' intention and the promise or commitment to pay, rather than the actual payment itself, in determining the validity of the sale document.

It is pertinent to refer to the case of Rajendra Prakash vs Smt. Babita Gupta Alias Pratiba 2000 (3) AWC 2253, where the Allahabad High Court addressed a similar issue. In this case, the plaintiff registered a deed of sale in favor of the defendant for a consideration of Rs. 1,25,000, paid through a cheque without any cash payment. However, the cheque was dishonored by the bank due to insufficient funds. Subsequently, the plaintiff requested the defendant to either fulfill the payment or declare the sale deed as illegal and void, but the defendant neither paid the amount nor took steps to annul the sale deed.

The plaintiff argued that the sale deed, being without consideration, conferred no title to the defendant and was therefore void, illegal, and inoperative, and not binding. On the defendant's behalf, it was contended that under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, even if the consideration is not paid, the sale deed does not become void if there is an intention to convey the property between the parties. The only remedy available to an aggrieved vendor is to sue for the recovery of consideration.

Relying on Section 55, sub-section 4(b) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the defendant argued that, at most, due to non-payment of consideration, the amount of consideration would become a charge on the property being conveyed. It was asserted that the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act would prevail over those of the Contract Act in case of any conflict or inconsistency between the two.
Quoting a passage from Mulla on the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, at page 303 of the Sixth Edition, the court considered the following excerpt:

[Include the relevant passage from Mulla on the Transfer of Property Act, 1882]

“The payment of price is not necessarily a sine qua non to the completion of the sale. If the intention is that property should pass on registration, the sale is complete as soon as the deed is registered whether the price has been paid or not, and the purchaser is entitled to sue for possession although he has not paid the price.

This is clear from the words of the Section, price paid or promised or part-paid or part-promised. But when although the deed recited that the price was not paid, and it was not in fact paid and so also possession was not delivered, it was held that the inference was irresistible that no title passed. A condition that price shall be paid in a year provided that possession was given within that time does not invalidate the sale deed. If the price is not paid, the seller cannot on that account set aside the conveyance.

He can only sue for the price; and he will have a charge on the property for the unpaid purchase-money. This is a non-possessory charge as explained in the note under Section 55(4)(b) and it will not justify the seller refusing to give possession.”

Several noteworthy court decisions shed light on the issue at hand:

1.    Kashidas v. Chaithuru, (1914) 19 Cal LJ 289 and Ghosh v. Rohini (1908) 13 Cal WN 692:
•    Over a century ago, these cases established that in the context of a sale, if the parties intend for the property to pass upon registration, the sale is considered complete as soon as the deed is registered, regardless of whether the price has been paid.
2.    Raj Nath Singh v. Paltu and others. 1908 All U 96:
•    This case held that non-payment of consideration does not invalidate a deed of sale.
3.    Gayatri Prasad v. Board of Revenue and others, 1973 All LJ 412:
•    The Allahabad High Court reaffirmed the view that if the intention is for the property to pass on registration, the sale is deemed complete upon registration, irrespective of whether the price has been paid.
4.    Kutcheriakota Vijayalakshmi v. Radimeti Rajaratnamba and others, AIR 1991 AP 50:
•    In a case where part of the consideration was admittedly paid, the Andhra Pradesh High Court took a similar stance, emphasizing that if the intention is for the property to pass on registration, the sale is complete.
5.    Basanti Mohanty v. Brahmanand Das and others, AIR 1996 Ori 86:
•    The Orissa High Court held that if the intention is for the property to pass on registration, the sale is complete upon registration, regardless of whether the price has been paid. The purchaser is entitled to sue for possession even if the price has not been paid.
6.    State of Kerala v. Cochin Chemical Refineries Ltd, AIR 1968 SC 1361:
•    In this decision by the Apex Court, it was held that in a mortgage case, even if the loan was not advanced, the deed of mortgage was considered valid and not void or ineffective.

These decisions collectively reinforce the principle that the passing of ownership and validity of a transaction can be determined by the intention of the parties, with registration playing a significant role, and non-payment of consideration alone may not necessarily invalidate the transaction.

The Apex Court in the case of Vidhyadhar v. Mankikrao and another AIR 1999 SC 1441 held as follows:

The real test is the intention of the parties. In order to constitute a sale, the parties must intend to transfer the ownership of the property and they must also intend that the price would be paid either in praesenti or in futuro. The intention is to be gathered from the recital of the sale deed, conduct of the parties and the evidence on record.

The decisions highlighted above emphasize that the complete payment of the sale price is not a strict requirement. The price may be paid wholly, in part, or promised. If the document indicates an intention to pay, even if the consideration is not actually paid, the document is not rendered invalid due to non-payment. However, if the intention is entirely without consideration, or the document lacks any consideration, it is considered void and ineffective.

A crucial distinction exists between a sale where the consideration is intended but not paid, and a situation where no intention to pay consideration exists at all. In the former case, Section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 comes into play, and the unpaid amount remains a charge on the property. Such a sale deed is legal and valid, granting the vendee a legal title to the transferred property, and the vendor cannot challenge the sale deed.

However, a cautionary note is provided, particularly for those selling real estate. It is advised not to transfer property based solely on cheques, but rather to ensure receipt of the entire sale consideration through methods such as RTGS, bank transfers, or bank drafts. This precautionary measure is essential to avoid protracted legal battles in civil courts for the realization of the sale consideration, which can consume time, energy, and financial resources without a guaranteed favorable outcome.
 
The Supreme Court, in the case of Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali, delivered a judgment on July 9, 2020, regarding the validity of a sale deed in the context of non-payment of the entire sale consideration. The key points from the judgment are summarized as follows:

1.    Non-payment of Sale Price Not Ground for Cancellation:
•    The Supreme Court held that even if the entire sale consideration has not been paid, it cannot be a valid ground for the cancellation of the Sale Deed.
2.    Relying on Vidyadhar v. Manikrao:
•    The Court relied on its previous verdict in Vidyadhar v. Manikrao, (1999) 3 SCC 573, which established that non-payment of a part of the sale price does not affect the validity of the sale. Once the title in the property has passed, the sale cannot be invalidated solely based on non-payment of the balance sale consideration.
3.    Intention to Transfer Ownership:
•    The Court emphasized that for a sale to be valid, the parties must have the intention to transfer the ownership of the property, either immediately or in the future. This intention is to be gathered from the recitals of the sale deed, the conduct of the parties, and the evidence on record.
4.    Order VII Rule 11 and its Application:
•    The Court explained the application of Order VII Rule 11, stating that it is an independent and special remedy allowing the court to summarily dismiss a suit if no cause of action is disclosed or if the suit is barred by limitation. The power under this rule is a drastic one, and the conditions specified in the rule must be strictly adhered to.
5.    Mandatory Nature of Order VII Rule 11:
•    The Court emphasized that Order VII Rule 11 is mandatory in nature. If the court finds that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action or that the suit is barred by law, it must reject the plaint.
6.    Bar of Limitation:
•    In the present case, the plaintiffs filed the suit after a delay of 5 and ½ years, seeking the cancellation of the Sale Deed. The Court noted that the suit was clearly barred by limitation, as the alleged cause of action arose in 2009, and the suit was instituted in December 2014.
7.    Relief of Cancellation Not Granted:
•    Considering the delay in filing the suit and the absence of legal action for recovery of the unpaid consideration, the Court held that even if the averments of the plaintiffs were taken as true, the non-payment of the entire sale consideration could not be a ground for the cancellation of the Sale Deed. The plaintiffs might have other remedies for recovery, but cancellation was not a valid relief.
In conclusion, the judgment underscores the importance of the intention to transfer ownership in a sale and establishes that non-payment of the entire sale consideration, in itself, is not sufficient grounds for the cancellation of a Sale Deed.

The judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of KANWAR RAJ SINGH (D) TH. LRS. VERSUS GEJO. (D) TH.LRS & ORS. CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9098 OF 2013 on the issue of Registration Act states:-

In terms of Section 47 of the Registration Act, a registered sale deed where entire consideration is paid would operate from the date of its execution. Thus, the sale deed as originally executed will operate. The corrections unilaterally made by the first defendant after the execution of the sale deed without the knowledge and consent of the purchaser will have to be ignored. Only if such changes would have been made with the consent of the original plaintiff, the same could relate back to the date of the execution. It is not even the first defendant's case that the subsequent correction or interpolation was made before its registration with the consent of the original plaintiff
 
The judgment of the Apex Court on the issue of part payment made subsequent to the sale in the case of P. Ramasubbammav/s V. Vijayalakshmiand Others Civil Appeal No. 2095 of 2022 held:-

The Apex Court held that once the execution of said Agreement and the payment/receipt of substantial sale consideration by way of an advance was admitted by the vendor, nothing further was required to be proved by the Appellant.
 
Determining the ground of fraud, the Supreme Court held in the case of C.S. Ramaswamy Versus V.K. Senthil & Ors. CIVIL APPEAL NO. 500 OF 2022 that:-

Even the averments and allegations in the plaint with respect to fraud are not supported by any further averments and allegations how the fraud has been committed/played. Mere stating in the plaint that a fraud has been played is not enough and the allegations of fraud must be specifically averred in the plaint, otherwise merely by using the word “fraud”, the plaintiffs would try to get the suits within the limitation, which otherwise may be barred by limitation. Therefore, even if the submission on behalf of the respondents – original plaintiffs that only the averments and allegations in the plaints are required to be considered at the time of deciding the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC is accepted, in that case also by such vague allegations with respect to the date of knowledge, the plaintiffs cannot be permitted to challenge the documents after a period of 10 years. By such a clever drafting and using the word “fraud”, the plaintiffs have tried to bring the suits within the period of limitation invoking Section 17 of the limitation Act. The plaintiffs cannot be permitted to bring the suits within the period of limitation by clever drafting, which otherwise is barred by limitation. At this stage, a recent decision of this Court in the case of Raghwendra Sharan Singh (supra) is required to be referred to. In the said decision, this Court had occasion to consider all earlier decisions on exercise of powers under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, which are considered by this Court in paragraphs 6.4 to 6.9 as under:- 15 “6.4. In T. Arivandandam [T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467], while considering the very same provision i.e. Order 7 Rule 11 CPC and the decree of the trial court in considering such application, this Court in para 5 has observed and held as under: (SCC p. 470) “5. We have not the slightest hesitation in condemning the petitioner for the gross abuse of the process of the court repeatedly and unrepentantly resorted to. From the statement of the facts found in the judgment of the High Court, it is perfectly plain that the suit now pending before the First Munsif's Court, Bangalore, is a flagrant misuse of the mercies of the law in receiving plaints. The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful — not formal — reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order 10 CPC. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits.” 6.5. In Church of Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society [Church of Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society v. Ponniamman Educational Trust, (2012) 8 SCC 706], this Court in para 13 has observed and held as under: (SCC p. 715) “13. While scrutinising the plaint averments, it is the bounden duty of the trial court to ascertain the materials for cause of action. The cause of action is a bundle of facts which taken with the 16 law applicable to them gives the plaintiff the right to relief against the defendant. Every fact which is necessary for the plaintiff to prove to enable him to get a decree should be set out in clear terms. It is worthwhile to find out the meaning of the words “cause of action”. A cause of action must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act no cause of action can possibly accrue.” 6.6. In ABC Laminart (P) Ltd. v. A.P. Agencies [(1989) 2 SCC 163], this Court explained the meaning of “cause of action” as follows: (SCC p. 170, para 12) “12. A cause of action means every fact, which if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the court. In other words, it is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act no cause of action can possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actual infringement of the right sued on but includes all the material facts on which it is founded. It does not comprise evidence necessary to prove such facts, but every fact necessary for the plaintiff to prove to enable him to obtain a decree. Everything which if not proved would give the defendant a right to immediate judgment must be part of the cause of action. But it has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff.” 17 6.7. In Sopan Sukhdeo Sable [Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Charity Commr., (2004) 3 SCC 137] in paras 11 and 12, this Court has observed as under: (SCC p. 146) “11. In ITC Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal [ITC Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, (1998) 2 SCC 70] it was held that the basic question to be decided while dealing with an application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code is whether a real cause of action has been set out in the plaint or something purely illusory has been stated with a view to get out of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code. 12. The trial court must remember that if on a meaningful and not formal reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, it should exercise the power under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. If clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, it has to be nipped in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order 10 of the Code. (See T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal [(1977) 4 SCC 467].)” 6.8. In Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy [Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal, (2017) 13 SCC 174], this Court has observed and held as under: (SCC pp. 178- 79, para 7) “7. The plaint can be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 if conditions enumerated in the said provision are fulfilled. It is needless to observe that the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC can be exercised by the court at any stage of the 18 suit. The relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding the application are the averments of the plaint only. If on an entire and meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing any right to sue, the court should exercise power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. Since the power conferred on the court to terminate civil action at the threshold is drastic, the conditions enumerated under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC to the exercise of power of rejection of plaint have to be strictly adhered to. The averments of the plaint have to be read as a whole to find out whether the averments disclose a cause of action or whether the suit is barred by any law. It is needless to observe that the question as to whether the suit is barred by any law, would always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The averments in the written statement as well as the contentions of the defendant are wholly immaterial while considering the prayer of the defendant for rejection of the plaint. Even when the allegations made in the plaint are taken to be correct as a whole on their face value, if they show that the suit is barred by any law, or do not disclose cause of action, the application for rejection of plaint can be entertained and the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC can be exercised. If clever drafting of the plaint has created the illusion of a cause of action, the court will nip it in the bud at the earliest so that bogus litigation will end at the earlier stage.” 6.9. In Ram Singh [Ram Singh v. Gram Panchayat Mehal Kalan, (1986) 4 SCC 364], this Court has observed and held that when the suit is barred by any law, the plaintiff cannot be allowed to circumvent that provision by means of 19 clever drafting so as to avoid mention of those circumstances, by which the suit is barred by law of limitation.” 7.9 Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions on exercise of powers under Order VII Rule 11 CPC to the facts of the case on hand and the averments in the plaints, we are of the opinion that both the Courts below have materially erred in not rejecting the plaints in exercise of powers under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC. The respective suits have been filed after a period of 10 years from the date of execution of the registered sale deeds. It is to be noted that one suit was filed by the minor, which was filed in the year 2006, in which some of the plaintiffs herein were also party to the said suit and in the said suit, there was a specific reference to the Sale Deed dated 19.09.2005 and the said suit came to be dismissed in the year 2014 and immediately thereafter the present suits have been filed. Thus, from the averments in the plaint and the bundle of facts stated in the plaint, we are of the opinion that by clever drafting, the plaintiffs have tried to bring the suits within the period of limitation, which otherwise are barred by limitation. Therefore, considering the decisions of this Court in the case of T. Arivandandam (supra) and other decision of Raghwendra Sharan Singh (supra), and as the respective suits are barred by the law of limitation, the respective plaints are required to be rejected in exercise of powers under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

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